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Government policy measures adopted by many developing countries to reform the public sector 
enterprise performances can be classified into two broad categories in terms of decision criteria taken 
into consideration. The first category of reform primarily focuses on distancing the government from 
ownership change and control issues of these enterprises. Partial privatization or divestment falls in this 
category of change reform mechanism. The second category aims at improving the environmental change 
aspects in which these enterprises operate and function. One such reform is delegation of operational 
and functional autonomy to managers of publicly owned enterprises through performance contracts 
and  reviews.  Empirical  evidence  on  the  gains  of  privatization  versus  benefits  of  autonomy 
delegation  from  the  developing  countries  that  have  undertaken these reforms in the past are yet 
inconclusive. The present study of India spanning over two decades of panel data with a decade of data 
for  evaluating  the  post  reform performance  of  the  centrally  owned  enterprises, provides evidence  of 
significant  positive  impact  of  autonomy  delegation  to  public  enterprise  management  on  firms 
profitability.  The  study,  however,  does  not  find  any  evidence  of  significant  impact  of  partial 
privatization and divestment. Further the study also finds significant impact of environmental reforms 
of  hard budget  constraint  and  deregulation  of  sectors  earlier  under  government  domain  to  private 
participants on the profitability performance of the public enterprises in India.  
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In the last two decades, economic reforms undertaken by governments’ world over 
have aimed at shrinking public deficit, significant proportion of which was attributed to 
poor  financial  performance  of  state  owned  public  sectors.  Reform  measures  were 
undertaken  in  almost  all  developed  and  emerging  economies  that  had  government 
ownership  in  some  form  or  other.  The  aim  was  to  reduce  public  enterprise 
dependence on government budgets and to provide new sources of revenue to the 
state in the short run. In general the reform measures can be grouped into two broad 
categories. The first category has consisted of reform strategies aimed at distancing the 
government  from  ownership  change  and  control  of  public  sector  enterprises 
(partial  or  complete  privatization).  Such  strategies  find  theoretical  support  in  the 
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arguments of property rights theorists like Alchian (1977), Alessi (1987) and public 
choice theorists like Levy (1987), Niskanen (1975) among others. Alchian (1977) and 
Alessi (1987) for instance, argue that firms under private ownership inherently perform 
better than publicly owned firms due to the presence of market for ownership rights 
wherein, owners of a private firm if dissatisfied with the managers can sell their stakes 
in the firm. The presence of tradable property rights in private firms help discipline the 
managers (agent) in maximizing shareholders (principal) wealth as compared to public 
ownership where such markets are virtually absent. Coupled with  the  absence  of 
market monitoring mechanism, the caretakers of Public Sector Enterprises (P S E) 
usually politicians and government bureaucrats in Indian context are often found to use 
their discretionary authority and control rights over the wealth of P S Es to further 
their own rent seeking activities (like providing employment to people of their 
constituency or party workers etc.,) and in the process hamper the incentives 
of the P S E managers in maximizing the performance of their firms. Given 
the above it is argued that it is ownership 'per se' that needs to be reformed to 
improve the performance of the P S Es (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 1998).  
The second category of reforms has been aimed at improving the environment 
in which the P S Es operate, rather than change the ownership of the firm partially or 
fully depending upon situation. Proponents of this viewpoint contest that 'ownership 
per  se  does  not  matter'.  Instead  they  believe  that  removing  the  environmental 
imperfections and distortions in which the state owned firms operate, in particular by 
implementing hard budget constraints, improving incentives to top management and 
by  and  large  linking  their  benefits  to  firms  performance,  delegating  enhanced 
functional  and  operational  autonomy  to  top  management  along  with  introducing 
product market competition & capital market efficiently as private enterprises. The 
objective  of  this  study  is  to  contribute  additional  evidence  on  the  benefits  of 
ownership change versus environmental reform in public sector enterprises. To do 
so the study draws on the evidence of P S E reforms from India. The value of 
undertaking a study of P S E reforms in India lies in the fact that India is one of the 
countries where an entire gamut of P S E reforms has been implemented sequentially 
over  the  years  that  includes  both  ownership  change  and  environmental  reforms. 
Thus an Indian study can enable one to undertake an analysis of the relative impact 
of  environmental  versus  ownership  reform  within  an  integrated  framework. 
Analyzing the performance of firms that have undergone both these category of 
reforms at different time periods in a single framework helps us contribute to the 
limited evidence that exists with respect to the efficacy of these two groups of reform 
strategies.  
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Review of Literature 
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of P S E reforms have been well documented 
for China and several countries of former Soviet Union including Russia, as well as 
Central and Eastern European countries. Coexisting with the evidence from several 
studies that privately owned firms perform better than public sector firms are evidence 
from studies that support the environmental reforms in State Owned Enterprises (S O 
E). However most studies examine one or other category of S O E reforms in exclusion 
of  others  and  only  few  studies  contribute  evidence  to  the  debate  on  benefits  of 
ownership  change  versus  environmental  reforms.  Of  these  studies  specifically 
pertaining to India are Majumdar (1998b), Shirley and Xu's (1998), Boubakri, Cosset 
and Guedhami (2004), Sudhir Naid (2004) and Gupta (2001). While Majumdar (1998b), 
analyzed the influence of soft budget constraint on efficiency performance of state 
owned firms in India, Shirley and Xu's (1998) focus was on the impact of performance 
contracts  signed  by  managers  of  state  owned  enterprises  with  their  respective 
governments  across  six  developing  countries  including  India.  Boubakri,  Cosset  and 
Guedhami (2004) analyze the difference in three years mean performance for pre and 
post partial privatization in 50 firms across 10 Asian countries including India.  
Sudhir Naid (2004) using similar methodology studied the mean differences in 
performance of P S Es in India pre and post partial privatization. The study by Gupta 
(2001), that is closest in the literature to the present analysis, has focused on the impact 
of partial privatization on Indian centrally owned firms revenue, labor productivity and 
on share of government loans in the total borrowings of firms. The study however does 
not take account of the autonomy  that was  delegated  to  P  S  E  managers  before 
partially privatizing the equity shares in these P S Es. Hence the partial privatization 
impact analyzed could have captured the effects of delegation of autonomy to central P 
S Es that was not controlled for in the estimation. The present study accounts for the 
delegation of autonomy reform while examining the impact of partial privatization 
on  profitability  performance  of  the  enterprise.  What  the  present  study  seeks  to 
undertake is an integrated analysis of the differential impact of the whole gamut of 
reforms ranging from P S Es operating environment change reforms (delegation of 
autonomy  and  soft budget  constraint  impact  along  with  de reserving  sectors  for 
private participation) to ownership changes of partial privatization on the profitability 




The data for the study is sourced from 'Public Enterprises Survey', published by 
the Department of Public Enterprises, Ministry of Heavy Industries, Government of 
India. Additional data is obtained from the 'Memorandum of Understanding', published 
by Department of Public Enterprises, Ministry of Heavy Industry, Government of India. 
For  special  purposes  some  data  has  been  taken  from  industrial  sources  and 
organizational websites  too  for  the  study  purpose. Hence the  sample consists  of a Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  71 
decade  of  enterprise  performance  data  pre  and  post restructuring  and  partial 
privatization. The centrally owned public enterprises belonging to manufacturing and 
service sector have been considered. The sample used for the study consists of 142 
firms grouped into 19 cognate groups following the cognate grouping of central P S Es 
in  Survey  of  Public  Enterprises,  2009  in  other words whole  gamut  of  data  used  is 
secondary data.  
Of the total sample, in 86 P S Es autonomy was delegated through the MoU 
system to top management. Further 56 P S Es that had signed MoU in atleast one year 
in the sample period later underwent partial privatization of central government equity 
holdings. Thus the sample allows one to draw comparison between firms that have not 
undergone the environmental reform of autonomy delegation against the firms that 
have been delegated only autonomy through MoU reform with no ownership change 
and those that have undergone both autonomy delegation and ownership change 
When the disinvestment of central government equity shares ROS 51% the enterprise 
(3 P S Es in the sample) moves out of the domain of Central government ownership 
and hence is excluded from the data set from that time period. Data for all the 
variables for all time periods was not available hence those data points were lost where 
profitability  variable  data  was  not  recorded  for  that  particular  year,  giving  an 
unbalanced panel with 142 firms. 
 
Variables of Interest 
Functional autonomy was delegated to Indian P S E managers through signing of 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Under this system, individual enterprises sign 
MoU with its respective government ministries at the beginning of the financial year. 
They are then evaluated and graded at the end of the financial year against the targets 
set in the MoU. Some firms that did not keep with the time allotted by the contract for 
submission of reports were not evaluated. A priori an enterprise would not be able to 
predict if it is going to be evaluated or not. Hence with the signing of MoU, a firm is 
expected to start striving towards fulfilling its targets set in the MoU. It is hypothesized 
that  signing  of  MoU  by  a  P  S  E  will  have  positive  impact  on  its  profitability 
performance. As pointed out by Winston (1993), under deregulation there are two 
opposing forces frequently at work.  
Firstly  the  inefficiencies  caused by  regulation generally  raise  the firms costs of 
operation but the insulation from competition created by regulation raise the firms' 
revenues, especially  in  firms  belonging  to  inherently  highly  competitive  industries. 
Thus under deregulation though firms can reorganize their operations and may be 
successful in reducing their costs, the excess profits that the firms were earning under 
regulated  environment  would  be  dissipated  in  deregulated  environment.  Thus 
deregulation dummy 'De reserve' captures the net impact of these two opposing 
forces on firms' profitability performance. If the hypothesis that private ownership is 
superior  to  public  ownership  holds,  one  would  expect  that  as  private  ownership 
increases,  the  profitability  performance  of  the  P  S  Es  would  improve.  The  study 
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shares disinvested by the central government in the enterprise. Further it may be that 
divesting higher percentage of central governments equity holdings to private parties 
may have varying impact on the P S Es performance. To capture the impact of soft 
budget  constraint  on  performance  of  P  S  E,  the  ratio  of  loans  borrowed  by 
individual enterprises from central government to total loans borrowed lagged by 
one year is taken. The variable capturing the soft budget constraint impact ('Soft 
loan') is expected to have negative impact on P S Es performance. 
 
Performance Measures 
Profitability as a yardstick of measuring P S E performance gained importance 
when governments world over started to feel the burden of loss making P S Es on their 
budget deficits. In India too, this is evident from the importance given to financial 
performance  ratios  in  the  MoU.  50  percent  weightage  was  given  to  financial 
profitability in the composite score evaluation of targets set under MoU, with almost 
20 percent weightage given to return on asset (ROA) ratio by almost all P S Es signing 
MoU's.  In  the  analysis  firms'  profitability  performance  is  measured  using  two 
accounting ratios namely, return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA) as adopted 
in several studies in the literature (Boardman and Vining, 1989, 1992; Boubakri and 
Cosset, 1998; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson et al, 1994). ROS, the profit 
margin capturing profitability of each rupee of sales, is calculated as profit before tax 
ratio of sales. ROA, a measure of the ability of the management to convert firms' 
capital to profits, is defined as profit before taxes as a ratio of total assets. One other 
profitability performance variable that is frequently used in the literature is return on 
equity  (ROE).  However,  ROE  cannot  be  calculated  for  firms  with  negative  net 
worth, a problem that is faced by almost one fourth of total P S Es by 2001 in India. 




The  study  accounts  for  other  firm  characteristics  that  may  also  affect  its 
performance  by  incorporating  control  variables.  A  description  of  these  and  their 
possible effects is given below: 
•  Export Intensity:   It   controls   for   the   effects   of exposure   to   
international competition. It is defined as proportion of exports to total sales and is 
expected  to have positive impact on P S Es performance. 
•  Depreciation  Intensity:  Defined  as  the  ratio  of  depreciation  expenditure  to 
sales,  it  proxies  for  capital  intensity  of  the  company's  technological  process.  No 
prediction is made regarding the sign of the variable. 
•  Size: To reflect the effect of unobserved factors that are related to size Ln 
(Asset) is introduced in the regression. As pointed out in the literature (Majumdar, 
1998b; Sarkar  and  Sarkar,  2000),  in  the  product  market,  size  reflects  possible 
entry barrier that might result from economies of scale. Size also reflects the extent of 
market power of a company. It is postulated to have positive impact on firm’s Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  73 
performance. 
•  List: Some of the P S Es were listed on local, national and international 
stock exchanges since 1994, when the National Stock Exchange, Mumbai, India was set 
up. As pointed out by Harvie and Naughton (2000) listing of state owned firms on 
stock  exchanges  results  in  long term  benefits  due  to  imposition  of  greater 
discipline  on  enterprise  management  that  result  from  the  scrutiny  that  listed 
companies are subject to from investors. This is more so if companies are listed in stock 
exchanges where public disclosure requirements are more stringent, and the scrutiny 
from investors more rigorous. Even though the Indian stock markets are not yet fully 
developed, listing the P S Es on these stock exchanges would put pressure on the 
management of these P S Es to perform better. Hence listing is expected to have 
positive impact on firm’s performance. This is captured by dummy variable 'List' that 
takes the value one for the year the firm is listed on the stock exchange. In our sample 
none of the P S Es were deleted. Hence the dummy once turned on for a firm remains 




In analyzing the impact of reforms on the performance of P S Es, the most likely 
form of selection bias that could affect the results is the problem of 'cherry picking’. 
As pointed out by Frydman et al., (1999) there is a possibility of 'cherry picking' arising 
due  to  certain  firms  being  picked  for  adopting  reform  strategies  (for  autonomy 
delegation and partial privatization) because they are in some relevant sense "better" to 
begin with. This might be the case, for example, if reforms are politically difficult for the 
Government to undertake due to resistance from certain interest groups. Government 
in such situations wants to prove the success of its reform policies and may pick the 
best cherries from its garden to implement the reforms. Any analysis to study the 
impact of these reforms should take account of such pre reform differences in the 
groups  of  firms. We  do so  in  our study by accounting for the unobserved group 
specific fixed effects ('αm') as given in equation (1) below: 
Yit = αm + λt + β' Xit + γ' Zit + εit                                                     
(1) 
Where: 
Yit    refers to the performance variable for firm 'i' at time’t’; 
Xit    refers to the variables of interest (reform variables); 
             Zit          refers to control variables; 
            β's and γ's are parameters to be estimated; 
            λt          refers to year effects ; 
            εit           refers to random component and 
           αm         capture the group specific characteristics of ROS sectional group 
'm'. 
In our analysis we distinguish three groups of firms based on the category of 
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undergone  the  environmental  reform  of  autonomy  delegation  through  the  MoU 
system (Partial reform). The second group comprises of firms that have undergone both 
autonomy delegation and ownership change (Full reform) and the third group refers to 
those P S Es that have not undergone either of these reforms. Thus the inclusion of 
group  effects  helps  us  differentiate  between  the  unobserved  group  specific 
characteristics that might have influenced the P S E to undergo reform in the first place 
from the impact of implementing the reform on the firm’s performance. We estimate 
the baseline specification given above in equation (1) for the entire sample. We further 
examine the impact of reforms on the performance of P S Es by using different control 
groups in an attempt to deal with most kinds of selection bias that could potentially 
affect our results.  
Under  the  baseline  specification,  we  study  the  impact  of  the  environmental 
reform  of  autonomy  delegation;  de reserving  monopoly  industries  under  public 
sector  and  soft budget  constraint  along with  ownership  change  reform  of  partial 
privatization on the firms' profitability performance. The baseline specification given 
by equation (1) is estimated for the entire sample. We account for the possibility of the 
problem of 'cherry picking' by incorporating the two group dummies 'Partial  reform' 
and 'Full  reform'. The dummy variable 'Partial  reform' refers to the group of P S Es 
that have undergone only the environmental reform of autonomy delegation through 
the MoU system. The 'Full  reform' dummy variable takes the value 1 for those P S Es 
whose top management was delegated autonomy and in later years the government 
equity  holdings  in  these  P  S  Es  were  partially  disinvested.  Thus  these  P  S  Es 
underwent  both  the  environmental  reform  and  ownership  change  phenomenon. 
Sample data analyzed is for the period 1994 1995 to 2005 05 for 142 P S Es. Of the 
total sample, in 86 firms autonomy was delegated to top management. Further in 56 P S 
Es government undertook partial privatization of its equity holdings to outside private 
parties.  We  further  examine  the  impact  of  the  environmental  reform  of  autonomy 
delegation and ownership change through partial privatization on the performance of P 
S Es by changing the control groups in an attempt to deal with most kinds of selection 
bias that could potentially affect our results. 
 
Impact of Autonomy Delegation Change 
In estimating the impact of delegation of autonomy to firm's management, the 
study  compares  the  post  reform  performance  of  142  P  S  Es  that  were  delegated 
autonomy with their own pre reform performance. The time period analyzed here is 
1994 95 to 2004 05, the latest year for which the reform data is available. Thus the 
sample  consists  of  a  decade  of  enterprise  performance  data  pre  and  post  
autonomy delegation. The environmental reform of autonomy delegation is captured 
through a dummy variable 'Autonomy'. Soft loans borrowed by P S Es ('Soft loan') and 
industries de reserved by government that were under public sector dominance 
('De reserve')  are  also  introduced  as  reform  variables  in  these  regressions.  We 
further  truncate  the  sample  data  at  firm  years  where  the  first  trenches  of  partial 
privatization took place in P S Es. This enables us to study the pure impact of autonomy Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  75 
delegation  to  top  managements  of  government  owned  P  S  Es  on  the  profitability 
performance of these firms. 
 
Incremental Impact of Partial Privatization 
In analyzing the incremental impact of partial privatization, the study compares 
pre and post partial privatization performance of a sample of centrally owned P S Es 
that  had  undergone  environmental  reform  of  autonomy  delegation.  The  sample 
consists of 142 P S Es, all of whom underwent MoU reform. In 56 of these 142 P 
S Es, partial privatization of central government equity holdings was undertaken in 
later years. The time period for the study is eleven years post 1994 95 when MoUs in 
the present form were first signed between P S Es and the government owners. The 
average  impact  of  government  equity  share  divestiture  on  P  S  Es  performance  is 
estimated by introducing the percentage of equity holding disinvested ('Part pvt'). The 
environmental reform of autonomy delegation was undertaken by all the P S Es in 
this sample in one or other time period prior to disinvestment. This is accounted for in 
the  analysis  by  incorporating  'Autonomy'  dummy  along  with  other  environmental 
reform variables ('Soft loan' and 'De reserve').  
Thus  in  examining  the  incremental  impact  of  partial privatization, the study 
contributes additional evidence to the debate on benefits of adopting environmental 
policy  reforms  versus  ownership  change.  It  may  also  be  that  higher  levels  of 
disinvestments have varying impact on the firm’s performance. We distinguish this from 
the above analyzed average incremental impact of partial privatization ('Part pvt') by 
incorporating  a  non   linear  (quadratic)  specification  'Part pvt  '  in  our  regression 
models.  We  test  the  robustness  of  the  reform  variable  coefficients  in  all  our 
regressions by dropping the year dummies that may be capturing part of the reform 
impacts as some of the reforms were implemented in one particular year for most of 
the P S Es in our sample data (like de reservation that was implemented in most of the 
industry  groups  in  1994 95).  All  regressions  are  estimated  after  taking  care  of  the 
presence of influential observations by truncating the distribution of the dependent 
variable at 1 percent low and 1 percent high ends of the distribution. We also correct 
for heteroscedasticity in all our regressions. 
 
Empirical Estimation and Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The mean and standard deviations for the performance measure along with other 
firm characteristics for the various groups of P S Es is given in Table (1). The first 
group (No Reform) refers to P S Es that have not undergone either the reform of 
autonomy delegation or partial privatization. The second group (Partial reform) refers 
to P S Es that have undergone the environmental reform of autonomy delegation 
through the MoU system and the third group (Full reform) refers to those P S Es 
that have undergone both the reform of autonomy delegation and ownership change 
through partial privatization. The average return on assets (ROA) for P S Es belonging 
to 'Full Reform' category was around 10 percent compared to lower average of 
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delegation. P S Es that did not undergo any reform (No Reform) performed poorly 
with negative average ROA of around 8 percent. The standard deviation for ROA is 
also higher for the category of P S Es belonging to 'Full Reform' as compared to 'Partial 
Reform' and 'No Reform' category, which have similar standard deviations suggesting 
that P S Es belonging to 'Full Reform' category are more heterogeneous in their ROA 
performance. In terms of average return on sales (ROS) ratio P S Es belonging to 'Full 
Reform' category shows a positive average of 0.4 percent. Average ROS is negative 
for both 'Partial Reform' and 'No Reform' category of P S Es, with 'No Reform' 
category having more negative average. Standard deviation is higher for 'No Reform' 
category of P S Es as compared to the other categories, indicating that 'No Reform' 
group is more heterogeneous in its ROS performance. 
 
Table 1: Data Summary Statistics (Period of Analysis: 1994 1995 to 2004 05) 
 
Variable  No Reform  Partial Reform  Full Reform 
ROA       
Mean   0.08  0.03  0.13 
Standard Deviation  0.23  0.18  0.31 
ROS       
Mean   0.63   0.10  0.004 
Standard Deviation  1.48  0.78  0.81 
Softloan       
Mean  0.69  0.52  0.32 
Standard Deviation  0.41  0.42  0.37 
Exint       
Mean  0.04  0.05  0.07 
Standard Deviation  0.17  0.15  0.11 
Number of Enterprises  30  74  38 
Number of Observatoins  89  40  73 
Note: ‘No Reform': Includes P S Es that did not undergo either the autonomy 
delegation reform or the reform of ownership change. 'Partial Reform': Includes P S Es 
that underwent only the reform of autonomy delegation through MoU system and no 
ownership change. 'Full Reform': Includes P S Es that underwent both the reform of 
autonomy delegation and ownership change through partial privatization. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  77 
 
The average ROA and ROS performance of P S Es belonging to 'Full Reform' is 
higher than averages for 'Partial Reform', which is higher than 'No Reform' averages. 
Thus there is a possibility of the problem of 'cherry picking' arising in our sample 
data where better performing P S Es were selected to undergo partial or full reforms. 
We account for this possibility of the problem of 'cherry  picking' by incorporating 
the  two  group  dummies  'Partial   reform'  and  'Full   reform'  in  our  empirical 
specification (see Equation 1). The average loans borrowed by P S Es from their 
owner central  government  are  highest  for  'No  Reform'  category  with  around  68 
percent. It is approximately 52 percent for 'Partial Reform' category and lower by 
around 20 percent for 'Full Reform' category of P S Es. Thus P S Es that have 
undergone both the reform of autonomy delegation and partial privatization have 
lower average soft budget constraint as compared to those that have undergone only 
autonomy delegation, who are less constrained by soft loans as compared to P S Es 
that  have  not  undergone  either  of  the  reforms.  While  some  firms  borrow  100 
percent  of their  loan amount  from central  government others do not  depend  on 
government loans at all (zero percent soft loans), lending heterogeneity to our sample 
data. This is indicated in the standard deviations of the three samples that range from 
37 to 43 percent. There is not much variation in average export intensity of P S Es 
belonging to various categories. On an average export intensity is around 4 to 7 
percent in P S Es with standard deviations ranging from 10 to 17 percent in all the three 
categories of P S Es. 
 
Regression Results: Impact of Autonomy Delegation 
The estimation results of the baseline specification for the entire sample using 
equation (1) for both the performance measures ROA (return on asset) and ROS 
(return on sale) is given in Table (2) below. 
 
Table 2: Impact of Autonomy Delegation and Ownership Change (Period 
of Analysis: 1994 1995 to 2004 05) 
 
Variable  ROA  ROA#  ROS  ROS# 
Autonomy  0.04*  0.03*  1.27*  1.06* 
Partial Pvt
1  0.02  0.01   0.27   0.03 
Soft loan   0.07*   0.07*   0.74*   0.76* 
Deresve   0.08*   0.13*   2.15*   1.39* 
Size   0.01*  0.00*  * 0.00*   0.10* 
Exint  0.02**  0.02**  0.21  0.30 
Dpint   0.01*   0.01*   3.29*   3.30* Study on impact of environmental change on selected public sector enterprises in India  78 
List  0.02  0.01  0.30  0.03 
Partial  Reform dummy 
$ 
0.03*  0.03*  0.36*  0.38* 
Full  Reform dummy $  0.03*  0.03*  0.20*  0.25* 
Intercept  0.06*  0.04*  1.14*  1.09* 
R Square  28  29  27  24 
F test@  0.18    8.58**   
Note:      * One ,two and three asterisks denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively # denotes regression results after dropping year dummies 1 The 
coefficient of 'Partial pvt' dummy is in percentage terms. 
@  denotes  test  statistics  for  the  equality  of  group  dummies  'Partial Reform 
dummy' and 'Full Reform dummy' $ denotes group dummy. 'Partial Reform dummy' 
that takes the value 1 through out the sample period for P S Es that have undergone 
only  the  reform  of  autonomy  delegation  and  no  ownership  change.  'Full Reform 
dummy' is turned on through out the sample for P S Es that have undergone both 
autonomy delegation and ownership change. These are intercept shifts that are included 
in the model to account for the problem of 'cherry picking'. 
'Autonomy’ dummy representing the impact of  delegation of autonomy to 
PSE managements through signing of MoU has significant positive impact on both 
the profitability performance measures (at 1% significance level) as seen from Table (2). 
The impact coefficient is approximately 0.03 percentage points for ROA while it is over 
0.2 percentage point for ROS. While the evidence of positive impact of autonomy 
delegation  on  productivity  performance of Chinese  SOE  is  documented  by  several 
studies  in  the  literature  (Groves  et  al.,1994;  Shirley  and  Xu,2001),  the  impact  of 
performance  contract  on  profitability  performance  of  SOE  is  not  found  to  be 
consistently positive (Li and Wu, 2002; Shirley and Xu, 1998). Li and Wu (2002) do not 
find any consistent impact of autonomy delegation (production autonomy) on return 
on  asset  performance  of  680  Chinese  SOE.  Shirley  and  Xu's  (1998)  study  of 
implementation of performance contracts in state owned enterprises for natural 
monopolies  across  six  developing  countries  including  India  (only  four  centrally 
owned P S Es were analyzed) did not find any improvement in the post performance 
contract signing ROA profitability trends. The results found in the present study for 
Indian P S Es, favor the implementation of performance contract. Positive results 
evidenced  in  this  study  signify  that  setting  of  one/  few  explicit  objectives  for  the 
enterprise  to  achieve  with  higher  weightage  to  profitability  targets  and  delegating 
autonomy to top management for achieving these targets through MoU system helped 
the  PSE  management  focus  its  efforts  in  improving  the  firm’s  profitability 
performance.  Managers  on  their  part  to  achieve commitment  from  the lower  level 
managers  and  employees  are  found  to  link  the  MoU  targets  to  internal  incentive 
schemes for the junior managers and employees (Vithal P., 2001).  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  79 
Further it may also be that with the initiation of privatization policy in some P S 
Es there are higher returns to be gained by the executives of better performing P S Es 
in the managerial job market (Gerard and Khalid, 2000), which further induces them to 
take  advantage  of  the  autonomy  delegated  to  them  and  thus  in  turn  improve  the 
performance  of  the  PSE.  Further  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  firms'  profitability 
improves post delegation of autonomy as compared to pre reform period we compare 
the post reform performance of P S Es with their own pre reform performance. In this 
analysis we exclude those P S Es that had not undergone the reform of autonomy 
delegation from our sample. In some of the P S Es that had undergone the reform of 
autonomy delegation to its top managements, the government equity holdings were later 
partially divested. Though we truncate our sample data at those firm years where the 
first trenches of disinvestments took place, we account for the possible problem of 
cherry picking by incorporating the 'Full  reform' dummy.  
The dummy takes the value 1 for P S Es that underwent both the environmental 
reform and in later years ownership change. This is done to account for the possibility 
that among the P S Es that underwent the partial reform of autonomy delegation some 
of the P S Es were better performing (that were later picked for implementing partial 
privatization  reform)  to  start  with.  We  account  for  this  in  our  analysis  ('Full  
reform'). The result is given in Table (3) below. Results seen in Table (3) indicate that 
delegating autonomy to P S Es top management significantly (at 1 % level for both 
performance measures) improves the profitability performance of firms. As pointed 
out earlier the emphasis on replacing multiple objectives of multiple principles by 
few clear goals for the management to achieve and providing functional and operational 
autonomy through MoU system help management to focus their efforts on improving 
the performance of the P S Es. Further we analyze the impact of ownership change 
that some of the P S Es underwent in the later years on the firms performance. In 
analyzing this we also try to evaluate the relative benefits of environmental reforms as 
against the reform of ownership change. 
 
Table 3: Impact of Autonomy Delegation (Period of Analysis: 1994 1995 to 
2004 05) 
 
Variable  ROA  ROA#  ROS  ROS# 
Autonomy  0.06*  0.05*  0.14*  0.09* 
Soft loan   0.11*   0.10*   0.19*   0.19* 
Deresve   0.12   0.04*   0.17***   0.11* 
Size   0.02*   0.02*  0.01**  0. 001* 
Exint   0.03   0.03  0.00  0.01 
Dpint   0.08*   0.08*   1.22*   1.19* Study on impact of environmental change on selected public sector enterprises in India  80 
List   0.04   0.05   0.08   0.09 
Full  Reform dummy  0.02*  0.02*  0.03*  0.03* 
Intercept  0.26*  0.26*  0.08  0.07*** 
R Square  25  24  26  25 
Note:      * One, two and three asterisks denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. # denotes regression results after dropping year dummies $ denotes 
group  dummy  that  takes  the value  1  for  all  sample  periods  for  P  S  Es  that  have 
undergone both autonomy delegation and ownership change reform. It is intercept shift 
that is included in the model to account for the problem of 'cherry picking'. 
 
Incremental Impact of Partial Privatization 
 
We analyze the incremental impact of partial privatization first by estimating the 
baseline specification given by equation (1) for the entire sample. Here we control 
for the possibility of 'cherry  picking' problem by incorporating the group dummies 
'Partial reform' and 'Full  reform' as described above. The results indicate that the 
average impact of partial privatization of central governments equity holdings in P 
S Es, captured here by coefficient of 'Partial pvt' has no significant impact on both 
profitability performance measures as seen in Table (2). Thus there is no evidence of 
average additional gains from partial privatization on both the profitability performance 
measures. This  result  for  the  partial  privatization  varies  from  other  studies  in  the 
literature for India like Gupta (2001) and Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2004). 
The former study as pointed out earlier does not account for the environmental reform 
of  autonomy  delegation to  PSE  managements  in  India.  In  our  analysis  explicitly 
accounting for autonomy delegation through MoU system with a longer time span 
of  data.  The  latter  study  by  Boubakri,  Cosset  and  Guedhami  (2004)  analyze  the 
difference in three years mean performance for pre and post partial privatization in 
50 firms across 10 Asian countries including India. They find partial privatization to 
have significantly improved profitability, efficiency and output performance in P S 
Es. However, the results from my analysis are more in confirmation with Sudhir Naid 
(2004),  who  finds  that  partially  privatizing  central  government  equity  holding 
significantly reduces return on sales and return on equity with no significant impact 
on  return  on  assets.  He  attributes  this  decline  in  profitability  to  the  increased 
competition and deregulation following the new economic policy of 1991 in India.  
The  study  is  similar  in  its  methodology  to  Boubakri,  Cosset  and  Guedhami 
(2004).  Further  our  results  are  also  in  confirmation  with  experience  of  ownership 
reforms undertaken in Egypt  studied  by  Omran  (2002),  who  do  not  find  any 
significant improvement in profitability, operating efficiency and output performance 
of partially or fully privatized firms in Egypt. All P S Es in whom central government 
equity holding was partially privatized had undergone MoU reform in some time 
period  prior  to  ownership  change.  A  better  specification  to  analyze  the  pure Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  81 
incremental impact of partial privatization would then be to truncate the sample data 
(firm year) prior to first MoU that was signed between the PSE management and 
central government owner. Further by excluding those P S Es that did not undergo 
any reform (environmental or ownership reform) from the analysis we also control for 
some selection bias. Thus the analysis compares the performance of P S Es that 
underwent partial privatization against those that were the most likely candidates 
for ownership change (P S Es that underwent autonomy delegation reform). Results 
for the two performance measures ROA and ROS are given in Table (4) below. 
 
Table  4:  Incremental  Impact  of  Partial  Privatization  (Period  of  Analysis: 
1994 1995 to 2004 05) 
 
Variable  ROA  ROA#  ROS  ROS# 
Autonomy  0.04*  0.04*  0.08*  0.05* 
Partial Pvt
1  0.09  0.08   0.01   0.02 
Soft loan   0.14*   0.11*   0.14*   0.14* 
Deresve   0.01   0.03**  0.00   0.03*** 
Size   0.01   0.01*   0.01*   0.01* 
Exint  0.06  0.04  0.04***  0.06 
Dpint   0.15*   0.15*  0.69*  0.70* 
List  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.02 
Full  Reform dummy  0.03*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02* 
Intercept  0.24*  0.23*  0.17*  0.17* 
R Square  22  25  18  19 
Note: * One, two and three asterisks denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. # denotes regression results after dropping year dummies 
1 The coefficients of partial privatization ('Partial  pvt' and 'Partial Pvt
2') are in 
percentage terms. $ denotes group dummy that takes the value 1 for all sample periods 
for  P  S  Es  that  have undergone  both autonomy delegation and  ownership  change 
reform. It is intercept shift that is included in the model to account for the problem of 
'cherry picking'. 
Results indicate that partially divesting central governments equity holdings to 
other private equity holders without transferring the management of the firm to them 
have on an average no significant impact on the profitability performance of the P S Es. 
It may be that partial privatization at higher levels of government equity holdings have 
varying impact on the performance of the P S Es. We test for this hypothesis by Study on impact of environmental change on selected public sector enterprises in India  82 
incorporate a quadratic term in our analysis ('Partil Pvt'). Results are presented in Table 
(5) below. 
 
Table  5:  Incremental  Impact  of  Partial  Privatization  with  Non linear 
Specification (Period of Analysis: 1994 1995 to 2004 05) 
 
Variable  ROA  ROA#  ROS  ROS# 
Autonomy  0.04*  0.03**  0.19*  0.15* 
Partial Pvt
1   0.18   0.15   0.57   0.46 
(Partial Pvt
2)
1  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Soft loan   0.13*   0.14*   0.28*   0.29* 
Deresve   0.01   0.03**   0.04**   0.16* 
Size   0.01*   0.01*  0.01  0.01 
Exint  0.04***  0.04  0.10**  0.11** 
Dpint   0.14*   0.16*   1.51*   1.47* 
List  0.00  0.01   0.01   0.05 
Full  Reform dummy  0.02*  0.02*  0.01  0.02** 
Intercept  0.27*  0.24*  0.08  0.09 
R Square  21  19  22  21 
Note : * One, two and three asterisks denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. # denotes regression results after dropping year dummies 1 The 
coefficients of partial privatization ('Partial  pvt' and 'Partial Pvt
2') are in percentage 
terms. $ denotes group dummy that takes the value 1 for all sample periods for P S Es 
that have undergone both autonomy delegation and ownership change reform. It is 
intercept shift that is included in the model to account for the problem of 'cherry 
picking'. 
 
As seen from the coefficients of 'Partial pvt', partially divesting equity holdings 
even at higher levels has no significant impact on the performance of P S Es. One 
recommended policy measure that may improve the enterprise performance is full 
privatization, with both ownership and control of the enterprise being passed on to 
private participants. 
Similar  reform  policy  measures  adopted  in  several  other  developing  and 
industrial countries has given positive results. However, as seen in this study, going half 
way and implementing privatization partially where the control over the management is Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  83 
still under central government, has not been effective in improving the performance of 
the P S Es. 
 
Impact of Soft loans and De reservation 
 
Soft loan as hypothesized has significant negative impact on both profitability 
performance  ratios  of  P S  Es  (significant at  1% levels  for  both ROA and  ROS) 
throughout the analysis. On an average a percentage point increase in soft loans for the 
entire  sample  of  P  S  Es  results  in  approximately  0.07  percentage  point  negative 
increase in ROA while it is higher by approximately 70 77 percentage point for ROS 
as seen in Table (2). The findings are in confirmation with Gupta (2001) who finds 
that  soft budget  constraints  have  negative  and  significant  impact  on  P  S  Es 
profitability  performance  (measured  as  ROS  profits)  in  India.  The  results  of  the 
present study are also consistent with Estrin's (2002) survey, where he finds hard 
budget  constraint  to  have  positive  impact  on  productivity  and  profitability  (sales 
growth) performance of firms, significantly so for non CIS countries as compared to 
less consistent impact for Russia and the CIS states. A similar trend is witnessed with 
the  coefficient  of  de reservation.  Dereserving  ('De reserve')  the  public  sector 
dominated industries and opening them to private competition on an average have 
significant (at 1% level of significance) negative impact on both performance ratios 
analyzed in Table (2).  
Introducing private sector competition in the industries reserved earlier for public 
sector investment has had a negative impact on public enterprise profitability. The 
above results contradict the results of Gupta (2001) who find de reservation to have 
positive significant impact on sales and profits of partially privatized firms in India. 
However as compared to Gupta (2001) whose sample period consists of only one time 
period prior to de reservation, the time horizon adopted in this study is twenty years 
with around ten years of data corresponding to pre reform period. With such a large 
time  horizon  we  are  able  to  better  capture  the  impact  of  de reservation.  Also we 
estimate several alternate specifications in our study to test for the robustness of our 
results. Thus the results of the present study reflects the fact that, the introduction of 
actual  and  potential  competition  from  private  sector  as  pointed  out  by  Winston 
(1993),  has  eroded  part  of  the  monopoly  profits  that  the  well  organized  producer 
groups of P S Es had benefited from, being under the regulated environment shielded 
from private sector competition over the decades. We test the robustness of the reform 
variable coefficients by dropping the year dummies that may be capturing part of the 
reform impacts as some of the reforms were implemented in one particular year 
for most of the P S Es in our sample data (like de reservation that was implemented 
in most of the industry groups in 1994 95). The results are given in Tables (2) (5). 
Almost all the regression results remain robust to this alternate specification except de 
reservation dummy in Tables (3), (4) and (5).  
We  find  the  coefficient  of  'De reserve'  has  significant  impact  on  both  the 
performance measures in all the regressions after dropping year dummy thus indicating Study on impact of environmental change on selected public sector enterprises in India  84 
that year dummies might have captured the de reservation impact rendering 'De 
reserve' coefficient  statistically insignificant in the earlier specification. Turning to 
control variables, public sector firms do not seem to enjoy any economies of scale or be 
able to exploit their market power due to their shear size captured by 'Size' variable. 
On the other hand size has significant negative impact on almost all performance 
measures as seen in Tables (2)   (5). Increasing export intensity in firms has a positive 
impact on their profitability though it is significant only in some of the regressions 
analyzed above. Significant negative coefficient of 'DpInt’ in almost all the regressions 
indicates that more capital intensive a firm is its profitability performance is negatively 
influenced while listing of P S Es ('List’) on local and national stock exchanges have no 
significant impact on firms performance measure. This may be because most of the 
PSE stocks that are listed are either not traded at all or are traded in small volumes 
infrequently, resulting in insignificant impact on firms' performance. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In  contributing  additional  empirical  evidence  on  the  benefits  of  environmental 
reform and ownership change reform, the chapter analyzes the case study of India, 
where both these type  of  reforms  have  been  implemented  over  the  past  decade. 
Indian  centrally  owned  P  S  Es  have  undergone  environmental  change  reforms  of 
delegation of autonomy through signing of MoU's, de reservation of sectors by the 
government that were earlier under public sector domain to private investment and 
hard budget constraint where government put pressure on P S Es to live with in their 
budget.  Further,  the  Government  of  India  has  also  partially  privatized  its  equity 
holdings in some of the enterprises that have undergone the reforms of autonomy 
delegation.  Thus  the  case  study  of  Indian  PSE  reforms  has  provided  one  with  an 
opportunity to study the differential impact of both category of reforms while allowing 
one to draw comparisons between firms that have not undergone any reform against 
those that have undergone only environmental reforms of autonomy delegation and 
those  that  have  undergone  both  ownership  change  (partial  privatization)  and 
environmental reforms (autonomy delegation).  
In  analyzing  the  above  we  try  to  control  for  the  possibility  of  most  of  the 
selection bias that may arise due to the problem of 'cherry  picking'. We do this by 
incorporating  group  dummies  that  capture  the  average  differential  performance  of 
group of P S Es that may be selected for implementing reforms (autonomy delegation 
and partial privatization) as they are better performing firms to start with. We also 
change our control groups to test the robustness of our results. The results indicate 
that the incremental impact of delegating autonomy to PSE management by setting 
performance targets and grading them for their performance through MoU system, 
have significant positive impact on the profitability performance of P S Es. One reason 
why it is so may be because of explicitly stating one/ few objectives and attaching 
weights to them in the individual enterprise MoU's helped managements of P S Es 
focus its efforts on improving the performance of the P S Es. Further delegating Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  85 
autonomy to management in achieving these targets through MoU system and the 
existence of managerial labor markets (Gerard and Khalid, 2000) act as additional 
incentives for the management to perform better in future business.  
Soft loans indicating the impact of soft budget constraint as hypothesized 
have  significant negative coefficient through out the analysis. Thus access to easy 
loans as argued by several in the literature in past (Bartel and Harrison, 1999; Kalirajan 
and Shad, 1996; Kornai, 1979 among others) results in poor performance of P S E. 
This result, as contended by Winston (1993), indicates that the monopoly rents that 
were accruing to public sector enterprises under the regulated environment where they 
were well insulated from private sector competition has eroded to some extent under 
the de reserved environment thus adversely affecting the profitability of these firms. 
The incremental impact of ownership reform of partial privatization in firms that have 
undergone environmental reforms on an average does not seem to have any impact on 
the  firm  performance.  One  recommended  policy  measure  that  may  improve  the 
enterprise performance is complete privatization, with both ownership and control of 
the  enterprise  being  passed  on  to  private  participants.  Similar  reform  policy 
measures adopted  in  several other developing and industrial countries 
25 has given 
positive  results.  However,  as  seen  in  this  study,  going  half  way  and  implementing 
privatization  partially where  the  control  over  the management  is  still  under  central 
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